





Economics Department Working Paper Series 
No.  5-2010 
 
Trade as an Engine of Creative Destruction 
Mexico experience with Chinese competition
* 
 
Leonardo Iacovone  
Development Research Group, World Bank 
Liacovone@worldbank.org  
Ferdinand Rauch 
Department of Economics, University of Vienna 
Ferdinand.rauch@univie.ac.at 
L. Alan Winters 
Economics Department, University of Sussex 
L.A.winters@sussex.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: This paper exploits the surge in Chinese exports from 1994 to 2004 as a natural 
experiment to evaluate the effects of a unilateral low wage trade and competition shock to 
producers in Mexico. We find that this shock causes selection at both firm and product levels as its 
impact is highly heterogeneous both on the intensive and extensive margins. Sales of smaller plants 
and more marginal products are compressed and are more likely to cease, while larger plants and 
products exhibit an opposite response. Similar results hold both for the domestic market and for 
competition facing Mexican exporters in a third market (i.e. the United States). 
 
JEL Classification:  F14, L11 
 
Key Words:  China, Mexico, multi-product-firm, trade shock 
                                                 
* The authors are grateful to Gerardo Leyva and Abigail Duran for granting us access to INEGI data at the 
offices of INEGI in Aguascalientes under the commitment of complying with the confidentiality 
requirements set by the Mexican Laws. Special thanks go to all INEGI employees who provided assistance 
and answered our questions: in particular to Gabriel Romero, Alejandro Cano, Araceli Martinez, Armando 
Arellanes, Ramon Sanchez, Otoniel Soto, Candido Aguilar, Adriana Ramirez. We also thank Christian 
Hansen for his help with the implementation of the quantile IV regressions and Philippe Aghion, Tibor 
Besedes, Chad Bown, Ana Cusolito, Judith Dean, Aaditya Mattoo, Guy Michaels, Emanuel Ornelas, Stephen 
Redding, Daniel Sturm as well as the participants at the seminars of ETSG, USITC, Penn State, Boston 
University, University of Vienna, London School of Economics, FREIT, the World Bank trade seminar and 
the Econometric Society World Congress for helpful comments. The views contained in this paper are of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the World Bank. The financial support of the World Bank’s Research 
Support Budget is gratefully acknowledged.   1 Introduction
Between 1990 and 2007 Chinese exports grew from 62 billions USD to 1.2 trillions USD, at the
staggering average rate of about 20 percent per year. China became the world's largest exporter
in 2009, and the second largest economy of the world in 2010. The emergence of China and
its impact on producers worldwide has been the focus of the attention of both policy-makers
and researchers. At the same time, policy makers concerned about the adverse consequences of
such a shock have been voicing their concerns and argued for protecting their industries.1
The emergence of China has caused angst among policy-makers on all continents and at all
levels of development. However, as argued in Winters and Yusuf (2007), in the near term
there is probably relatively little to fear for OECD countries because their specialization in
sophisticated products and in capital goods insulates their main producers from much of the
competition. The pressure on the less sophisticated sectors and rms is in some sense pushing
in the direction of improved overall economic performance by speeding up creative destruction.
Similarly, policy-makers in low income countries often worry that China will leave no room
for them in the markets for labor-intensive manufactures, but in fact as China becomes richer,
its comparative advantage is shifting away from the simplest goods towards a middle range.
Thus low income countries are also relatively insulated from the force of Chinese competition.
Arguably the most direct competition is on middle-income countries whose established positions
in manufactured markets have come under threat. This is the focus of this paper.
Our main contributions by this paper are to close two gaps in the literature. First, we provide
a detailed investigation of the causal impact of competition on the intensive and extensive
margins of both products as well as plants. Second, we recognize that competition may be felt
as strongly in export markets as at home, and hence also evaluate these impacts on a third
country market.2 To our knowledge this has not been done before. On both markets we nd
strongly heterogeneous eects of the competitive shock on the extensive (rm exit and survival)
and intensive (sales of plants) margins. We also nd evidence of product reallocation within
plants as competition pressures them to focus on their core competencies.3
We reach these results by treating the emergence of China on the export markets as a natural
experiment of a strong and sudden surge in the competition facing Mexican manufacturing
producers. As depicted in gure 1 Chinese exports to Mexico and the United States increased
1Some examples from the media to highlight this point: \[We] must not repeat the mistakes of the nineties,
when an `invasion' of Chinese products destroyed entire sectors of our industry [...]" (Medium Enterprises
Association of Argentina, April 6, 2004), or: \I made it very clear to Minister Bo Xilai that we will take the
legal steps to give Brazilian industry the right to protect itself" (Brazilian minister for Industry, Development
and Commerce after meeting with his Chinese counterpart, October 4, 2005.) See also Arroba et al. (2008).
2We should underscore that the share of Mexican exports to the US is larger than 85%; in this sense we are
analyzing the impact on nearly the whole Mexican exports.
3In this context see also Iacovone, Javorcik (2008), Eckel et al. (2009).
2substantially in terms of both value and share during the period considered. The share of trade
from China in Mexican imports grew from 0.007 in 1994 to 0.084 in 2004, a factor of 12. In
comparison, the import share from Africa and Oceania to Mexico changed by a factor of 1.04,
from other Asian countries by a factor of 1.35 and from South America by a factor from 1.41.
These share increases were contrasted by falls in the shares of North America and Europe by
factors of 0.96 and 0.84. In values, all these continental groups increased the values of their
exports to Mexico. This does not suggest that China has crowded out other developing country
imports, but rather that China appears to be the larger part of a broad tendency raising the
importance of developing countries in Mexican imports. This sizeable growth was matched by
only a moderate increase of trade 
ows in the other direction; the share of Chinese imports from
Mexico increased from 1.9 to 2.8 percent from 1994 to 2004.4 Hence we interpret the situation
at hand as a unilateral trade shock and not a mutual trade expansion.
Turning to export markets, Mexico is one of the countries that is likely to be strongly aected
by Chinese competition, given that within NAFTA Mexico has had a comparative advantage
for the production of labor intensive goods and that China's exports to the USA have increased
strongly. The share of imports from China in total US imports increased from six percent in
1994 to 14 percent in 2004. Given that the large majority of Mexican exports (over 85 percent)
go to the United States, we can be sure that the competition shock will aect Mexican exports
rather than just induce a geographical reallocation. The objective of this study is to provide
an example of how trade can work as a force of creative destruction that leads to competition
enhancing readjustments within and across rms. For this reason we focus on both reallocation
between rms and within rms, at product level.
There have been several recent studies of the impact of Chinese competition at sectoral level.5
These studies have shown where the pressure has arisen and its nal eect, but they are not
able to address the details of how economies adjust to this pressure. Adjustment is undertaken
by rms which nd their market positions eroded and it is only by studying rms that we are
able to see whether Chinese competition induces an active response in terms of, say, innovation,
introducing new products or giving up on old ones, new investment, etc, or a passive one in
terms of cuts in investment and employment. A situation in which the shock considered has
dierent impacts on dierent plants, and also brings about a reallocation within plants can not
be described at sectoral level. These answers are important missing elements in the discussion
of the full impact of China's emergence on incomes and growth.
Firm-level studies of Chinese competition are rare. Among the few examples are Bernard,
Jensen and Schott (2006) or Fernandes and Paunov (2008). However, none of the existing
4Source: COMTRADE. See also Dussel Peters (2007).
5See for example Freund, Ozden (2006), Hanson, Robertson (2007), Lederman et al. (2008), Soloaga et al.
(2007), Devlin et al. (2006), Lall et al. (2005).
3studies investigates the impact of competition at product level, or analyzes it on a third export
market.
In addition to these ndings our results are also relevant for rms and policy makers alike. We
show how the rise of China aected production patterns in Mexico, and suggest that larger,
more productive rms and products are relatively shielded from the adverse eects that this
competition generates.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some related empirical articles
and models from the theoretical literature, section 3 describes the applied data and strategy.
Section 4 describes the results of the investigation, and section 5 evaluates some additional
explanations that might be brought forward. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our work is related to several areas of research. Most studies analyzing the impact of the
emergence of China on the world markets deal with the eect on developed countries, for which
the pressure possibly has a constructive intersectoral eect. We ask about a country whose
comparative advantage lies rmly in the same sort of sectors and sophistication as China's, as
Mexico's comparative advantage within NAFTA does.
First, there exists a large number of studies that rely on sectoral trade 
ows data to assess the
competitive threat from Chinese exports to Latin American producers (Freund, Ozden (2006),
Hanson, Robertson (2007), Lederman et al. (2008), Soloaga et al. (2007), Devlin et al. (2006),
Lall et al. (2005)). Other studies have evaluated the impact of Chinese exports on wages and
employment for various parts of Latin America, see Levinsohn (1999) for Chile, Pavcnik and
Goldberg (2005) and Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2009) for Colombia, Pavcnik,
Blom, Goldberg and Schady (2004) for Brazil and Pavcnik (2002) for Chile. A sectoral study
of the eects that Chinese imports to the US had on Mexican imports to the US nds some
evidence for crowding out on this third market (see Iranzo and Ma (2006)). In a broad study
Jenkins, Dussel Peters and Mesquite Moreira (2008) emphasize that the emergence of China
brings about winners and losers in Latin America, and its eect tends to be asymmetrical.
Previous rm level studies highlight that foreign competition not only hurts producers but also
pushes them to improve their eciency and organization. In a paper that is closely related
methodologically in their use of Chinese exports as a natural experiment, Bloom, Draca and
Van Reenen (2008) nd that imports from China to Europe increased the innovative activity of
surviving rms in Europe, while decreasing the chances of survival and employment. Bernard,
Jensen and Schott (2004) show that Chinese competition in the US boosts high wage and high
skill companies, and causes the decline of low wage and low skill industries. Bernard, Jensen
4and Schott (2006) investigate how rms react to exposure to international trade and show that
plant survival and growth are negatively correlated with competition, but skill intensity, and
industry switching positively.6
The question of the impact of trade on product level and within-rm reallocations however is
largely unexplored. The few exceptions are Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010), who nd that
the impact of product switching on US manufacturing growth is as large as that of rm exit
and entry to the market, Baldwin and Gu (2005) who nd evidence that competition reduces
the diversication of Canadian producers, Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik and Neary (2009), who
show that Mexican producers tend react to NAFTA trade liberalization by focusing on their
core competencies.
In terms of theory, numerous theoretical articles on emerging trade models and multi-product
rms are closely related to our analysis, and provide related hypotheses. Bernard, Redding
and Schott (2009) develop a model of multi-product rms that predicts the demise of the
less productive rms and products resulting from trade liberalization. We test and conrm this
hypothesis in our data. Their model however does not predict the asymmetric sales shifts across
and within plants we describe, since it relies on a CES demand and thus constant markups.
The model by Eckel and Neary (2010) suggests that within-rm adjustments as a consequence
of trade reforms might generate substantial gains due to higher eciency, and is also closely
related in generating our predictions. Further related models include the neo-Schumpeterian
growth models pioneered by Aghion et al. (2005).
Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2009) is closely related to our study as it extends Melitz and
Ottaviano (2009) by introducing a multi-product dimension. This model predicts that a bilat-
eral trade liberalization leads to an increase in competitive pressure, which in turn leads rms
to drop their marginal products (the ones that also have a lower share in production), and
reallocate their resources to an increased production of the remaining goods. The inter-rm
reallocations generate an additional aggregate productivity increase. For export markets they
predict that more competition will lead to the dropping of less substantial products and rms.
This model does not however lead to these predictions when a unilateral trade shock is analyzed
(for example a unilateral productivity shock, or decrease of trade costs). Additional short-run
assumptions are required to reach hypotheses that are consistent with our ndings.
All the mentioned models derive hypotheses closely related to those that we test. In appendix
2 we provide our own toy model, which demonstrates under simple and general assumptions
an intuitive way to think about the eects of Chinese competition in partial equilibrium. The
essence of this toy model is to consider a retailer in Mexico: If (1) China succeeds by under-
cutting existing prices, (2) a lower cost product or plant is larger and (3) switching from the
6In this context see also Arroba et al. (2008), Bernard and Jensen (2007) and Yusuf et al. (2007) and
Teshima (2009).
5Mexican producer to the Chinese producer comes at a retailer specic xed cost, we nd that
a share of the retailers switch from Mexican to Chinese producers. Conditional on quality, this
switching probability is higher for smaller plants. Analogous to the literature we consider a
multi-product plant to be a collection of products with correlated productivities. This simple
view generates all the hypotheses we consider: (a) Exit is more likely for smaller products, (b)
sales reduction is proportionally larger for smaller products, (c) exit is more likely for smaller
products and (d) exit is more likely for smaller plants. See appendix 2 for a formalization of
this idea.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Mexico is one of the countries most intensely aected by the emergence of Chinese exports
(see Freund and Ozden (2006), Hanson and Robertson (2007)). Between 1994 and 2004 the
value of Chinese imports to Mexico increased exponentially from 0.5 to 14.4 billion USD, which
corresponds to an increase of the share of Chinese imports in total imports from 0.6 to 7.3
percent (see left graph in gure 1). In the same period China's exports to the US increased
from 41 to 201 billion USD, which corresponds to an increase from 6 to 14 percent of US imports
and re
ects a substantial impact on the US market (see right graph in gure 1).
To investigate this relationship we rely on the Monthly Industrial Survey (EIM) data on Mexican
plants provided by the Mexican Institute of Statistics (INEGI). This dataset covers about 85
percent of all Mexican industrial output. This unique survey contains detailed information on
sales and exports of each of the products manufactured by Mexican plants as well as information
on employment broken down by skills.7 Further, we use trade data from COMTRADE8 at the
classication level HS-1996 (the well known harmonized coding system from the World Customs
Organization).9
7These datasets have been used and described in previous studies, see for example Iacovone 2008b and
Iacovone and Javorcik 2008
8For bilateral trade transactions we rely on reported imports since it is generally believed that importer-
reported data tend to be more accurate.
9The INEGI production database relies on the Mexican Industrial Classication CMAP-1994 (Clasicacin
Mexicana de Actividades y Productos) at product level (i.e. 8-digit), while the trade data is based on the HS-1996
classication provided by the World Custom Organization at 6-digit level. The Mexican eight digit data gives
a detailed description of products. For example: In the category of alcoholic beverages it distinguishes between
detailed products such as Vodka, Whiskey or Gin. We match the individual product code manually using its
description. We conduct this match of these databases relying on the English and Spanish HS 1996 classication
obtained from the Export Helpdesk of the European Union (Export Helpdesk, 2009) and the Spanish language
HS classication obtained from the SICA project from the Ecuadorian Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
(SICA, 2009). The only CMAP products that we do not consider are those for which a correspondence was not
possible to make, mainly the broadly dened \other" categories. Whenever more than one HS code corresponds
to one CMAP product we use the average trade value across the dierent HS codes. The full created matching
correspondence between CMAP and HS codes is available on request.
6After merging the trade and plant-product level datasets we are left with information on 2744
individual products and a number of plants varying between 6219 and 4439 because of attrition
during our sample period (from 1994 to 2004). The main variables of this dataset are described
in table 1. The specic measure of exposure to foreign competition, calculated at individual
plant-product-level, is the share of China in total imports in the market concerned, while at
the plant level we compute the weighted average of this measure for the products of each plant,
where the weights are equal to the sales share of each product.
Using this combined dataset we estimate equations of the following form:
yit = 1Zit 1 + 2Zit 1xit 1 + 3Xit 1 + Dt + Fi + it; (1)
where yit is a plant specic outcome variable of interest for plant i at time t, Zit a measure
of the Chinese competition shock, Xit a set of sector and rm characteristics, and Zitxit the
interaction of the Chinese competition with xit, a subset of Xit. Several other studies have
used the import penetration rate from China or broader classes of low-wage countries, for
example Broda, Romalis (2009), Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) or Bloom, Draca and Van
Reenen (2008). Dt denotes a year xed eect and Fi is a plant xed eect.10 Our measure of
Chinese competition Zit 1 is the share of China in total imports to either the US or Mexico.
The control variables we use are the value of total imports, plant size, the Herndahl index
of product market competition, the export share and the ratio of white to blue collar workers
(skill share). Additionally we control for log total imports to Mexico or the US respectively.11
The two outcomes of interest in this study are sales and exit. Exit is dened as:
yit =
(
1 in the last year that the plant is in the sample
0 in all other years
We drop the last year of the sample (2004) in the exit regressions, since for this year we can't
distinguish plants that exit from those that do not. We focus on these two outcomes, since
hypotheses in recent theoretical papers have focused on sales and exit probability in their
hypotheses (see discussion in Section 2). We leave the study of other outcomes of interest for
future work.
We estimate a similar model to investigate the eect on product level. The only dierence
is that we rewrite the equation in terms of plant-product i, which involves product specic
outcomes, control variables on product and plant level, and plant-product level xed eects. In
10Dt is a variable equal to zero in all years except t, and one in t, Fi is equal to zero for all plants except for
plant i.
11The Chinese competition variable is a fraction of total imports. Additionally, we also control for the value
of total imports, although our results are robust to the exclusion of this control variable.
7all our regressions we cluster standard errors on the level at which we observe the competition
from China.12
We are aware of potential endogeneity of our main variables of interest (Zit and its interaction)
which may bias our estimates of 1 and 2. One reason for endogeneity would be reverse
causality. Thus we instrument Chinese exports to Mexico with Chinese exports to the EU and
separately Chinese exports to the world excluding US, the EU and Mexico. Further we create
the interactions of these export values with xit which provides us with additional instruments
for the regressions that involve interaction terms. China's export strategy was mainly to copy
existing products at lower prices. Thus, as is widely believed, at the heart of the rise of China lie
policies within China, local policy making, the successful attraction of FDI, the establishment
of joint ventures with Western rms and other policy decisions within China (see Keefer (2007)
or Huang (2003)). All these are largely independent of strategic decisions of Mexican plants.
Ideally an instrument could measure production within China directly, but absent detailed
product level data for the time period considered, we have to rely on Chinese exports to the
destinations mentioned above as a correlated measure.
A potential concern about the exogeneity of the instruments is that product-year specic global
technological trends might aect both Chinese exports and Mexican rms and thus invalidate
our instruments. There are three answers to this: First, if China is still catching up in technology
level for manufacturing and not at the frontier, it is not immediately aected by technology
changes at the frontier. Second, if a technology shock were to shift the productivity of certain
goods globally, it is likely that the corresponding productivity impacts on China and Mexico
would be positively correlated, since both these countries have a labor comparative advantage.
Thus the instrument would be positively correlated with the error term of the regression, and
bias the IV results against us towards zero. We nd however, that the IV results are eigher
the same or larger13 in absolute value than the OLS estimates. Third, in table 13 we rerun our
main specications and include in addition industry-year xed eects in the IV estimations.
These pick up technology shocks that impact related products. As discussed below, apart from
being less precisely estimated, the results are little changed by the inclusion of these additional
control variables.
Another typical concern to related studies is the comparability of treatment and control groups,
ie. if plants and products aected by competition from China dier initially from those that
are not. As depicted in gure 1, Chinese trade to Mexico increased considerably after 1998,
while the Chinese shock before that period was less dramatic. We create an indicator of rms
12At the product level the competition varies at 8 digit CMAP codes, which is the cluster we apply. At the
plant level competition varies at plant level only, since competition for each plant is a weighted mean of its
products and thus plant specic. Given that we apply plant xed eects, we do not apply clusters in the plant
regressions. Such clustering treatment is consistent with Moulton (1990).
13See discussion below.
8that were aected by Chinese competition during the years 1998-2004, and regress log sales at
rm level for the years 1994-1998 on that variable. In this sample of over 26.000 observations
we do not nd dierences in initial sales between rms facing later competition and rms that
do not (with a p-value of 0.912).14
A nal concern is that when we estimate the equation with sales as outcome, we use a lag-
dependent variable and an interacted lag-dependent variable in panel data with xed eects. As
shown by Nickell (1981), the coecient on the lagged variable is likely downward biased. The
size of the bias for such estimations in nite samples, and in particular the bias for the interacted
variable is to our knowledge unknown. In Appendix 1 we run a simulation to show that the
coecient on the lag-dependent variable, its interaction and the exogenous variable used in the
interaction are all three biased towards zero; hence our results are likely to underestimate the
true size and signicance of the impact in these regressions. Moreover,the biases for our two
main variables of interest (the competition from China measure, and the competition interacted
with sales) are small.15
4 Results
Sectoral level
For the sake of comparability with the literature we start with sectoral regressions. Our re-
sults highlight the importance of going beyond sectoral OLS regressions.16 For this exercise
we aggregate the data to six digit CMAP level, which leaves 205 sectors in 10 years (2050
observations). We regress total sectoral sales on Chinese competition. In the OLS regressions
we nd no signicant eect of the Chinese import share on sectoral sales in Mexico. This is
in line with the results of other studies involving aggregate data, which also nd a small or
insignicant impacts (for example Wood and Mayer (2009)). However, we nd a positive eect
of the Chinese import share to the US on exports of Mexican plants to the US.
The instrumental variable estimates, on the other hand, are negative and signicant at 1 per-
cent level for both the export and the domestic market. The rst stage of the IV estimates
shows a strong positive correlation between Chinese exports to Mexico and the US and both
instruments. Thus we nd evidence of competitive pressure on Mexican manufactures due to
14A similar exercise for exit can't be undertaken in the same way, given that competition is plant-year specic,
and we do not observe future competition for plants that exit. With log export sales the corresponding p-value
is 0.07, hence it is also not signicantly dierent at ve percent level of signicance. The lower p-value in
the export market might re
ect the fact that Chinese exports to the US were already pronounced in the years
1994-1998.
15In 1000 data simulations we cannot reject that the estimate is equal to its true value in 88 percent of
estimates for the competition measure, and 82 percent for the interaction (see appendix 1 for details).
16The tables with the results and other tables are provided in the web-based appendix published at
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/rauchf, or available at request.
9Chinese competition both domestically and in the third market. The dierence between the
OLS and the IV regressions highlights the need to take into account endogeneity problems,
which seem to be especially severe in the context of a sectoral analysis.
Our key argument is, however, that these results at sectoral level hide an important amount of
heterogeneity at rm and product level. With this objective in mind we move to a ner degree
of disaggregation and investigate the impact of Chinese competition on both the extensive and
intensive margin, at plant and product level.
Plant level regressions
In all the following plant regressions we exclude some data outliers such as plants claiming to
export more than they sell overall and plants characterized by extreme values in the rates of
Chinese imports growth.17
At plant level we rst investigate the relationship between the Chinese competition and plant
exit from the market using OLS and IV (see table 2). The plant exit variable used as an
outcome in table 2 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a plant has positive sales at times
t   1 and t, and no sales at time t + 1, and zero otherwise. Hence this variable indicates the
year during which a plant leaves the market. We control for the following lagged variables on
plant level: the log total imports to Mexico, log total sales of the plant, the Herndahl index as
a proxy for sectoral competition (a measure which is also a weighted mean of the competition
for each of the product manufactured by the plants), the plant's export share and the ratio of
white to blue collar workers. Additionally we include plant and year xed eects. This rich set
of control variables allows us to condition the results on numerous sources of dierence between
Mexican rms.
In the rst column we nd that when excluding the main interaction term between size and
Chinese competition, Chinese domestic competition in (t   1) appears to have no signicant
conditional mean eect on plant exit in the OLS regressions, a result which is conrmed by
the IV regression in the third column. In the second column we include an interaction between
plant sales and Chinese competition. As suggested by the literature (see for example Mayer
et al. (2009), Melitz (2003), Melitz et al. (2009)) we think of plant size being correlated with
productivity and/or managerial ability. In this latter specication we uncover a signicant
asymmetric eect: plants with smaller overall sales are more aected by Chinese competition
than larger plants. The marginal eect of competition on the probability of exit is estimated to
be 0:77 0:07ln(sales) in OLS. The mean and median log plant sizes are around eleven, and the
size percentile at which the mean estimated eect is zero is around 70. This signicant result
17We exclude those instances when Chinese imports increase by more than 300 percent or decrease by more
than 90 percent within a year, since given that the trade values are weighted means of product competition such
huge changes are more likely to re
ect changes in the product mix than in actual competition. In total these
outliers amount to about 10 percent of the data. Our results are robust to the inclusion of outliers, however.
10for the extensive margin also holds in the IV regression.18
One rst stage for column 3 and two rst stages for the two interacted variables in column
four are presented in the last three columns. The variable \China comp. -EU -US" shows
the export share of China to the world with the exception of the EU and the US, and \China
comp EU" shows the export value of China to the EU. The terms \interaction instrument
1" and \interaction instrument 2" are the interactions of these instruments with the variables
interacted in the IV regressions.19 The p-value of the Sargan test of exogeneity of instruments,
the p-value of a test of underidentication and the F-value of the rst stage are also displayed.
The F-statistics suggests a strong explanatory power of the rst stage, with strong positive
correlation of exports to the EU and to the rest of the world with Chinese exports to Mexico.
In the rst stages for column (4), the interaction instruments have more explanatory power
than the mean eects; the joint eect remains positive.
We repeat a similar estimation with outcome variable plant exit from export market in table
3 (again OLS, IV and rst stage). In these regressions we focus on the subset of rms that
have a positive export share only, and analyze how the shock of Chinese exports to the US
aected their likelihood of exiting from export markets. As before we control for log imports to
the US, competition, rm size, the skill share and the export share of rms. A similar pattern
emerges: An increase of Chinese competitive pressures in the export market does not increase
the probability of Mexican plants withdrawing from exports in the rst column. This mean
eect is also not signicant in the IV regression. The sales interaction however shows in OLS
and IV the same asymmetric eect that we found for exit from the domestic market. A positive
exit probability for small plants becoming smaller for larger plants. The rst stages continue
to have high explanatory power. In the rst stages to the US, Chinese exports to the rest
of the world have a small eect compared to Chinese exports to the EU and become widely
insignicant when we add interactive sales.
Next we turn to investigate plant's responses on the intensive margin, ie. plant sales. Table 4
shows the OLS results where log plant level domestic sales are the explained variables. First of
all, we show in the rst column that we do not nd any average aect due to increased Chinese
competition. However, when we include an interaction term between the degree of Chinese
competition and plant size we nd that while on average an increase in competition reduces
plant-level sales, this eect is highly asymmetric, as the larger a plant is (in the regression
measured by export sales) the less it responds by reducing its sales. In other words, Chinese
competition pushes smaller and less productive plants to become even smaller while larger and
18If the IV coecients are larger than OLS this is usually interpreted as unobserved response heterogeneity,
which is commonly observed in similar contexts. Detailed discussions of this problem can be found for example
in Lileeva and Tre
er (2009) or Card (2001).
19For example: \interaction instrument 1" in the regression with the export share interaction is equal to the
rst instrument (\China comp world-EU-US (t-1)") times the lagged export share.
11more productive ones are less or not aected (column 2). This combined eect is modestly
signicantly dierent from zero in OLS, but strongly signicant in IV.
In the corresponding export market regressions for exporting plants (see table 5) the same
pattern emerges. We do not nd an average eect of competition from China on the export
markets in IV, but again we nd in both OLS and IV that the impact of competition is
asymmetric forcing smaller plants to reduce their exports sales while the larger ones' response
is the opposite, as shown by the coecient on the interaction term between Chinese competition
on the plant's sales. The rst stages of tables 4 and 5 show that Chinese exports to Mexico
are more strongly correlated with Chinese exports to the World outside of the US, the EU and
Mexico than with Chinese exports to the EU, while we observe the opposite for Chinese exports
to the US.
Quantile regressions
In the previous section we highlight an important asymmetric eect of size on exit and sales;
namely that larger plants appear less eected by the adverse eects of the Chinese competition
shock. However, in the previous model we impose a linear restriction on the heterogeneous
eect to size. To explore the nature of this asymmetric eect further, and also to allow for
dierent eects at dierent levels, we perform quantile regressions and quantile IV regressions
of the domestic size regression (see table 6 and table 7).20 In these tables we demean variables
on plant level to imitate the eect of plant xed eects. The only outcome variable in the
quantile regressions is sales, since they can not be computed for binary outcomes. On the right
hand side we include employment, so that the denominator of the skill share variable (which
indicates the share of white collar workers) does not drive its coecient. In table 8 we modify
the standard regression by adding employment interaction at nine dierent sales quantiles,
such that the column titled Q1 provides the estimates for distributional changes at the 10th
percentile. Results in OLS and IV suggest a concave relationship between Chinese competition
and sales. OLS estimates are negative at 10 percent level of signicance for plants below the
70th percentile, and become insignicant above. The IV estimates for the plants at the 90th
percentile become positive. In both estimates we nd a large slope at the lower end of the sales
distribution.
In table 8 we use the ratio of white to blue collar workers as a measure of skill intensity of plants,
and interact this measure with the log value of Chinese imports to Mexico. The coecients on
Chinese competition show again the tendency to disappear with size. We use the estimates of
this table to draw the marginal eect of competition on a size-sales surface. This allows us also
to show that the impact of competition for rms with the same size but dierent skill shares,
as well as the impact of holding the skill share constant and varying size. Figure 2 displays this
20For the implementation of the quantile IV regressions we use the strategy and codes developed by Cher-
nozhukov and Hansen (2006).
12size - skill surface. The gure suggests that the eect of competition is most hurtful for the
smallest and least skill intensive plants, and it increases when moving along either dimension,
the size or the skill axis. Industries that are either very large (such as textile bers) or very
skill intensive (such as elevator construction) or both (automotive parts) were not aected by
the Chinese shock.
Product level
Next we investigate the extensive margin responses at product-level. Similar to the denition
of plant exit, product drop at time t is equal to one if a product is manufactured at time t   1
and t, but not at t + 1 and t + 2.21 In these regressions we control again for log total imports,
for the skill share, product market competition, the number of products of a rm, the export
share of that product, and the share that the product has within the rm.
Table 9 shows the overall drop of products as a consequence of Chinese competition. In this
exercise we restrict the sample to multi-product plants, those plants that produce more than
one product. In all product regressions we use plant-product xed eects (such that product
i produced in plant j diers from product i produced in plant k, and also from product l
produced in plant j) and cluster robust standard errors by product categories (CMAP 8-digit).
On average, we nd a positive and signicant eect of Chinese competition on the probability of
exit in the OLS and the IV regressions. The second and forth column introduce an interaction
with the share of products within plants. Our choice to use sales shares instead of sales is
motivated by a wish to get closer to predictions from the multi-product literature. We think
of a product with a larger share as a more protable product (Mayer et al. 2009) or \core
products" (Eckel and Neary 2010, Eckel et al 2009). Also at product level we nd evidence
of selection eects as the impact of Chinese competition is asymmetric across products. Core
products, or the ones that represent a larger a larger share of plant's sales, are less likely to
be dropped. This heterogeneous responses at product level are conrmed in our IV regressions
as shown in the fourth column of Table 9. The rst stages show again a positive correlation
between Chinese exports to Mexico and other parts of the world, and the F-statistics are
reasonably high.
We repeat the exercise focusing only on products sold in the export market, restricting the sam-
ple to exporting plants. The only change in the specication for these product-level regression
consists in controlling additionally for the exit of plants from export market. Product drop from
export at time t is dened, as before, equal to one when a product is exported at time t 1, in
t, but not t+1 and t+2. In these regressions we control additionally for the exit of plants from
all markets, and from export markets. The coecients on the variable measuring the degree of
Chinese competition in the US market are not signicant when this variable is not interacted
21Alternatively we have tested the robustness of our results by dening product drop at time t equal to one
if a product is manufactured at time t   1 and t, but not at t + 1 and our results are substantially unchanged.
13with the share of product on total plant sales. However, once more we nd, both in OLS and
IV regressions, evidence of reallocation and heterogeneous responses as the interaction between
the degree of Chinese competition and the share of products sales is negative and signicant.
This indicates that core products are less likely to exit export market in the face of Chinese
competition.
Next we investigate the responses along the intensive margin at product level. We use sales
as outcome and not shares, to avoid having a mechanical eect that shrinking product shares
imply increasing product shares for other products. Table 11 conrms once more the \creative
destruction" eect of competition and its reallocative consequences with less important products
being forced to contract while \core" products expand. In column 1 of Table 11 we show there is
actually no mean eect of competition; however, when we introduce an interaction term between
competition and the product's share in column 2 we nd that there is a signicant asymmetric
eect. The coecient on the variable capturing competition alone is negative and signicant,
but it is counterbalanced by the interaction term so that while competition forces a contraction
along the intensive margin on average this eect is attenuated, and eventually reversed, for the
\core products". These results are consistent across OLS and IV estimation (column 2 and 4
in Table 11). The only case when an \asymmetric" eect of competition does not emerge is
Table 12 where we present the product-level response to the Chinese competition on the export
market. In this case, both in the OLS and IV estimations, we nd a signicant and negative
eect of Chinese competition on product-level sales. The interaction is still signicant, but the
overall eect never changes sign. Thus these results suggest that rms restructure production
to focus on their core products on both the domestic and export market.
The product regressions all include rm-product xed eects and thus provide within plant-
product eects. A less strict setting is provided in the appendix, where we replace the plant-
product xed-eects by industry xed eects at CMAP-8 digits. The results remain similar in
sign but change in magnitude and level of signicance.
Quantile regressions can not be applied at the product level straight-forwardly, since in the
product regressions on sales the interactions are size shares and the outcomes size. Thus when
we perform a quantile regression of the interaction equation in table 11 (rst column) this can
not be directly compared with the second column, since the quantiles represent sales and not
sales shares. In the web based appendix we provide these quantile results, which show that the
eect of competition is signicantly negative for small products, and positive for large products
and not signicantly dierent from zero for the medium ones.
Summary
Our results consistently provide evidence of the asymmetric eect of Chinese competition on
Mexican rms: Smaller plants and products are more likely to exit, while larger plants and
\core products" are largely shielded from the competition shock. The outcome is summarized
14in gures 3 and 4. The x-axis shows sales or sales share centiles for plants and products respec-
tively, while the y-axis gives the marginal eect of competition, derived from the corresponding
IV regressions using the coecient on Chinese competition and on the interaction term multi-
plied by the corresponding size. The shapes and signicance of these curves re
ect the results
previously described: larger plants and products are less eected by Chinese competition in
terms of sales and exit probability. Magnitudes can be readily obtained from these graphs;
for example the exit graph in gure 4 suggests that an increase of one percent in imports of a
certain good from China increases exit probability by 0.5 for these products on the domestic
market if they occupy 10 percent of plant sales, but have no eect on the exit probability for
goods that occupy 90 percent of plant's sales.22
5 Robustness and additional ndings
To demonstrate robustness and plausibility of our results, we perform various robustness tests.23
A rst concern is that some plants and products did not face any competition from China during
the period analyzed, which could contribute to generate noise in the results. To address this
concern we rerun the results on plant level separately for the 20 percent of plants most aected
by competition and the 20 percent least aected, measured by mean competition. When we
rerun estimations similar to the second columns of tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the sample of plants
that are most eected from competition, we nd coecients on Chinese competition and the
interaction of Chinese competition that are statistically signicantly dierent from zero, and
indistinguishable from the coecients obtained in the full sample. In the sample of bottom 20
percent competition coecients are not signicantly dierent from zero, which re
ects that in
this sample there is very little information about Chinese competition.
A second robustness check is used as a \placebo" test. We evaluate if future competition from
China has any impact on current plant sales. Specically, we analyze the eect of competition
to be faced four years after (which should not in
uence performance in the present), and repeat
the sales regressions presented in the second column of tables 4 and 5. We can not reject that the
coecients on competition from China and its interaction are equal to zero. This demonstrates
that the emergence of Chinese competition for certain products was not anticipated over the
period of four years.
Third, Mexican policy makers were active in ling anti-dumping cases against Chinese compe-
22For the computation of these graphs we use only the two coecients that include our measure of the
competition from China, which represents the estimated marginal eect. If however the partial derivative of
any other coecient with respect to competition is non-zero, the intercept of the graphs would be shifted.
23For reason of space we do not include these robustness checks, however all the tables are available upon
request.
15tition early on (the anti-dumping data was taken from Bown (2009)). A sixth of the products
in our sample was subject to an attempted Mexican anti-dumping complaint, which presents
room for alternative interpretations of our ndings. In particular, we face the problem of en-
dogeneity of the anti-dumping cases, which might create a dierent link between competition
and our outcome variables of interest. To address these issues we repeat the plant level analysis
only for those products where no anti-dumping cases were led. Our results remain similar in
terms of size and signicance in the subsample where no anti-dumping cases were led.
A fourth concern relates to specic developments in the technology of certain goods, which may
aect all Chinese exports and Mexican rm behavior directly and thus invalidate the IV strategy.
To confront this concern we include industry-year xed eects in the main specications.24 The
main results remain the same in size and signicance, and are not signicantly dierent in terms
of magnitudes (see table 13).
Fifth, some of the marginal eects graphs and quantile regressions suggest a benecial impact
of Chinese competition on plants at the top end of the sales or skill distribution. One dimension
through which Chinese exports may aect Mexican production in a benecial way might be
through reducing the prices of imports (see Amiti, Konings 2007). This might be an additional
channel in
uencing both plant exit probability and also sales, and omitting it could bias our
estimates. To account for this concern we generate a measure of the Chinese shares in inputs
using the input-output tables for 2003 provided by INEGI and the Chinese trade values from
COMTRADE.25 For the computation we weight each sector listed as input by its imports
share, and the import share by the Chinese share in inputs for that sector. This is equal to the
weighted sum of inputs imported from China at sectoral level where the weights are given by
the coecient of the input-output table. Total imports from China for a sector are positively
correlated with Chinese imports for inputs to that sector as apparent from a gure we provide
in the web based appendix. The robustness table in the web based appendix provides columns
that are identical to columns (2) in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5, but we only provide the main variables
of interest and add the new inputs variable. This table shows two results. First, in the rst four
columns we show that the main results presented earlier hold when we add a control proxying
for the Chinese imported inputs penetration. While in certain caess the signicance of the
coecients is marginally reduced, qualitatively the results remain the same. Second, the eect
of the Chinese import penetration mimics that of the exposure to Chinese import competition:
for small rms it increases their probability of exit and reduces sales, while the contrary holds
for larger rms. This provides evidence that the larger plants are able to capture potential
24These are based on HS-2 digit industry measures. A more disaggregated level such as HS-6 would be
perfectly correlated with Chinese competition, and thus take out the variation of our right hand site variable of
interest.
25Given the size of the available input-output table this variable is computed at sectoral level (with 32 sectors)
only.
16benets of Chinese competition on the input markets better than their smaller competitors.
This might be an important channel through which plants of dierent size are dierently aected
by competition, but other asymmetric elements probably remain present.
6 Conclusions
The huge increase of Chinese exports in recent decades provided us with a quasi-natural exper-
iment to evaluate the impact of a surge in competition on the extensive and intensive margin
both at plant and product-level. In this study, for the rst time to our knowledge, we analyze
the impact of such competitive pressures both on the domestic market and the export market
at sectoral, plant and product level.
We nd that the surge of China challenged Mexican rms, and led to plant exit, exit of product
and sales contraction. These eects are asymmetric however. First, and most crucially, while
smaller and less productive plants are forced to shrink and exit from the market, this eect is
attenuated and eventually reversed for larger and more productive plants. Second, this process
of \creative destruction" and market selection operates not only at rm- but also at product-
level. Such heterogeneous micro-level dynamics are hidden by average eects at sectoral level,
pointing towards the need to use rm- and product-level data and allow for heterogeneous eect
through interaction terms.
These results conrm that the rise of Chinese exports has signicantly in
uenced existing
production patterns, a nding of great relevance to policy makers and rms worldwide. We show
that while a crowding out eect is observed for less productive plants, the more productive larger
plants can cope with this competition. While we do not measure it directly, this heterogeneity
increases averages productivity in the sectors aected. These results do not of course tell us
how the advent of China as a world trading power has aected Mexican welfare. They pay no
regard to consumers' benets, nor to the extent to which competition in manufacturing has
led to growth in other sectors. Even within manufacturing the extent of the aggregate shock is
not always clear. What the results do show, however, is why Chinese competition might face
political resistance and that one proactive response to it may be to `move up market'. The
future of Mexican manufacturing appears to lie in greater eciency and sophistication and that
policy responses to Chinese competition should be in this direction rather than defensive. Thus,
for example, policy should permit and facilitate change, rather than frustrate it by supporting
failing rms. It should recognize the centrality of large and ecient rms to the response, rather
than focusing on small and medium enterprises, and it should promote skills and innovation by
permitting them to earn high rewards when they succeed. These are not new messages - many
policy-makers have advocated this at a rm or a sectoral, or even an economy-wide level - but
17this paper is the rst to have produced evidence for that proposition.
These results reinforce the messages emerging from the recent theoretical literature on hetero-
geneous rms spurred by the seminal paper of Melitz (2003) and recently expanded towards
the introduction of a further layer of heterogeneity at product-level (Eckel and Neary 2010,
Bernard et al 2009, Mayer et al 2009).
Still pending for future research is to understand more in detail the mechanisms through which
these \heterogeneous" responses operates at rm- and product-level, such as the role of inno-
vation, rm organizational practices, skills and workers' training.
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22Figure 1: Impact of Chinese exports on the US and Mexico
Note: Left scales: import values (billion USD), right scales: share of China in total imports
of market. Source: COMTRADE.
23Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Plant data variables
Mean S. D. Min. Max.
China comp. Mex 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.86
China comp. US 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.95
Export share 0.10 0.22 0.00 1.00
Log sales 10.54 1.91 0.00 18.01
Log export sales 9.21 2.45 0.00 17.84
Skill share 0.31 0.20 0.00 1.00
Nr. of products 3.18 2.93 1.00 33.00
Herndahl 0.08 0.09 0.01 1.00
Product data variables
China comp. Mex 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.96
China comp. US 0.08 0.15 0.00 1.00
Share 0.32 0.36 0.00 1.00
Log sales 8.49 2.63 0.00 18.00
Log export sales 8.14 2.63 0.00 17.84
Note: This table presents main variables used in the regressions. China comp. Mex and China
comp. US denote the shares of Chinese in total imports, Skill share the ratio of white to blue
collar workers, and Share the sales share of products within plants.
24Table 2: Domestic plant exit; OLS, IV and rst stage
OLS IV First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (Fs 3) (Fs 4) (Fs 4)
Exit Exit Exit Exit Chn comp Mex Chn comp Mex Chn x sales
Chn. comp. Mex (t-1) 0.0266 0.770** -0.0446 1.258**
(0.0463) (0.319) (0.110) (0.514)
Log imports (t-1) -0.00157 -0.00150 -0.00155 -0.00142 0.000258 0.000240 0.00337
(0.00141) (0.00141) (0.00144) (0.00144) (0.000198) (0.000197) (0.00214)
Log tot. sales (t-1) -0.0576*** -0.0563*** -0.0575*** -0.0553*** 0.000619** -0.00103*** -0.00817**
(0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00225) (0.00238) (0.000307) (0.000328) (0.00356)
Herf. (t-1) 0.0891* 0.0924** 0.0904** 0.0969*** 0.0126** 0.0115** 0.160***
(0.0459) (0.0460) (0.0367) (0.0367) (0.00501) (0.00498) (0.0541)
Exp. share (t-1) -0.0139 -0.0137 -0.0139 -0.0135 0.000214 -0.000280 -0.00620
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.00164) (0.00163) (0.0177)
Skill share (t-1) -0.00553 -0.00733 -0.00561 -0.00889 -0.00291 -0.00180 -0.0342
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.00202) (0.00201) (0.0218)
Chn. x sales (t-1) -0.0696** -0.125***
(0.0272) (0.0454)
Chn. comp. -US -EU (t-1) 0.0161*** -0.00129 -0.175**
(0.00141) (0.00781) (0.0849)
Chn. comp. EU (t-1) 0.428*** -0.0792** -5.584***
(0.00701) (0.0349) (0.379)
Interaction instrument 1 0.00194** 0.0354***
(0.000798) (0.00867)
Interaction instrument 2 0.0488*** 0.973***
(0.00336) (0.0365)
Year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35828 35828 35376 35376 35376 35376 35376
Sargan p - value 0.706 0.239 0.239
F-Statistic 448.4 418.3 448.0
Note: Domestic exit indicates plants that leave the sample. Robust standard errors used, stars give signicance at one (***), ve (**)
and ten (*) percent level of signicance. The variable Chn. comp. Mex is the share of China in total Mexican imports. The last three
columns show one rst stage for the the instrumented variable in column three and two rst stages for the instrumented variables in
column four.
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5Table 3: Exit from export; OLS, IV and rst stage
OLS IV First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (Fs 3) (Fs 4) (Fs 4)
Exit exp Exit exp Exit exp Exit exp Chn comp US Chn comp US Chn x sales
Chn. comp. US (t-1) 0.0321 0.798*** 0.162 1.577***
(0.0608) (0.221) (0.212) (0.579)
Log US imports (t-1) -0.00390 -0.00393 0.000344 -0.000222 0.00545*** 0.00545*** 0.0550***
(0.00410) (0.00411) (0.00436) (0.00438) (0.000650) (0.000650) (0.00658)
Log exp. sales (t-1) -0.0369*** -0.0319*** -0.00996*** 8.96e-05 -0.000343 -0.000395 0.0613***
(0.00466) (0.00471) (0.00344) (0.00510) (0.000533) (0.000540) (0.00546)
Herndahl (t-1) 0.0596 0.0586 0.0467 0.0498 -0.0293** -0.0295** -0.302**
(0.0908) (0.0912) (0.0922) (0.0925) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.144)
Exp. share (t-1) 0.0804*** 0.0827*** 0.0311 0.0279 0.00872** 0.00883** 0.0880**
(0.0304) (0.0303) (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.00424) (0.00425) (0.0430)
Skill share (t-1) -0.000652 -0.00819 -0.00963 -0.0260 0.00812 0.00849 0.0281
(0.0475) (0.0476) (0.0456) (0.0462) (0.00706) (0.00709) (0.0716)
Chn x sales (t-1) -0.0777*** -0.136***
(0.0202) (0.0508)
Chn. comp. -US -EU (t-1) -0.0264*** -0.00610 -0.362
(0.00741) (0.0503) (0.508)
Chn. comp. EU (t-1) 0.621*** 0.451*** -8.942***
(0.0204) (0.136) (1.372)
Interaction instrument 1 -0.00189 0.0253
(0.00455) (0.0460)
Interaction instrument 2 0.0152 1.351***
(0.0121) (0.122)
Year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11414 11414 12089 12089 12089 12089 12089
Sargan p-value 0.317 0.207 0.207
F-Statistic 143.1 126.4 173.6
Note: Note: Exit from export indicates plants that leave the export sample. Only exporters considered. Robust standard errors used,
stars give signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*) percent level of signicance. The variable Chn. comp. US is the share of
Chinese in total US imports. The last three columns show one rst stage for the the instrumented variable in column three and two
rst stages for the instrumented variables in column four.
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6Table 4: Ln Domestic Sales; OLS, IV and rst stage
OLS IV First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (Fs 3) (Fs 4) (Fs 4)
Dom. sales Dom. sales Dom. sales Dom. sales Chn comp Mex Chn comp Mex Chn x sales
Chn. comp. Mex (t-1) 0.0177 -1.200* -0.485* -6.743***
(0.117) (0.689) (0.259) (1.401)
Log imports (t-1) -0.000420 -0.000497 -0.000247 -0.000691 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.00210
(0.00497) (0.00497) (0.00390) (0.00391) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00234)
Log tot. sales (t-1) 0.658*** 0.656*** 0.658*** 0.645*** -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0107***
(0.0136) (0.0137) (0.00597) (0.00661) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.00365)
Herf. (t-1) -0.527*** -0.533*** -0.518*** -0.550*** 0.0100** 0.0101** 0.157***
(0.129) (0.130) (0.0940) (0.0944) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.0560)
Exp. share (t-1) -0.956*** -0.957*** -0.955*** -0.960*** 0.00111 0.001 0.0107
(0.0645) (0.0644) (0.0322) (0.0323) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.0192)
Skill share (t-1) -0.0554 -0.0520 -0.0564 -0.0384 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0484**
(0.0488) (0.0489) (0.0391) (0.0393) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0233)
Chn x sales (t-1) 0.113* 0.594***
(0.0601) (0.130)
Chn. comp. -US -EU (t-1) 26.61*** 16.22*** -106.7***
(0.475) (2.824) (31.03)
Chn. comp. EU (t-1) -0.261** 1.369** 14.85**
(0.132) (0.604) (6.638)
Interaction instrument 1 -0.155*** -1.894***
(0.0575) (0.632)
Interaction instrument 2 0.985*** 37.37***
(0.264) (2.901)
Year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39254 39254 38774 38774 38774 38774 38774
Sargan p-value 0.683 0.453 0.453
F-Statistic 522.0 277.5 454.9
Note: Robust standard errors used, stars give signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*) percent level of signicance. The variable
Chn. comp. Mex is the share of Chinese in total imports. The last three columns show one rst stage for the the instrumented
variable in column three and two rst stages for the instrumented variables in column four. The instruments have been adjusted with
a factor of 10 8 to improve legibility.
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7Table 5: Ln Export Sales; OLS, IV and rst stage
OLS IV First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (Fs 3) (Fs 4) (Fs 4)
Exp sales Exp sales Exp sales Exp sales Chn comp US Chn comp US Chn x sales
Chn. comp. US (t-1) -0.498** -3.033*** -0.632 -3.511***
(0.196) (0.702) (0.491) (0.948)
Log US. Imports (t-1) 0.0269** 0.0277** 0.00615 0.00674 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.0644***
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00682)
Log Mex. imports (t-1) 0.00521 0.00530 0.0266** 0.0274** -0.001** -0.001** -0.0144**
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.00635)
Log exp. sales (t-1) 0.423*** 0.404*** 0.423*** 0.403*** <0.001 <0.001 0.0271***
(0.0192) (0.0197) (0.0119) (0.0132) ( <0.001) ( <0.001) (0.00657)
Herf. (t-1) -0.575** -0.580** -0.579** -0.585** -0.0384*** -0.0379*** -0.409***
(0.261) (0.260) (0.278) (0.277) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.145)
Log exp. share (t-1) 0.276*** 0.268** 0.277*** 0.269*** 0.00766* 0.00670 0.0466
(0.106) (0.106) (0.0886) (0.0885) (0.00457) (0.00458) (0.0464)
Skill share (t-1) -0.136 -0.109 -0.135 -0.106 0.0107 0.0114 0.0697
(0.156) (0.157) (0.141) (0.141) (0.007) (0.00731) (0.0740)
Chn exp x sales (t-1) 0.260*** 0.289***
(0.0650) (0.0805)
Chn. comp. -US -EU (t-1) -0.0362*** -0.143*** -2.279***
(0.0088) (0.0278) (0.281)
Chn. comp. EU (t-1) 0.776*** 0.993*** -1.676**
(0.019) (0.0695) (0.704)
Interaction instrument 1 0.0123*** 0.235***
(0.00300) (0.0304)
Interaction instrument 2 -0.0243*** 0.960***
(0.00721) (0.0730)
Year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12139 12139 11771 11771 11771 11771 11771
Sargan p-value 0.165 0.334 0.334
F-Statistic 195.4 176.1 232.7
Note: Robust standard errors used, stars give signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*) percent level of signicance. The variable
Chn. comp. US is the share of Chinese in total US imports. The last three columns show one rst stage for the the instrumented
variable in column three and two rst stages for the instrumented variables in column four. Only exporters considered.
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8Table 6: Quantile regression - plant sales
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
Log Chn imports (t-1) -0.025*** -0.009** -0.006** -0.004* -0.003* -0.004* -0.003 -0.000 0.004
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Log total imports (t-1) -0.029* -0.019** -0.011** -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.005 0.011 0.012
(0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Log nr employees (t-1) -0.039 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002 0.010* 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.052*** 0.088***
(0.022) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015)
Log sales (t-1) 0.749*** 0.745*** 0.748*** 0.751*** 0.743*** 0.723*** 0.704*** 0.672*** 0.612***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.015)
Herndahl (t-1) -0.971*** -0.441*** -0.370*** -0.330*** -0.303*** -0.241*** -0.286*** -0.296** -0.615***
(0.242) (0.127) (0.074) (0.059) (0.056) (0.064) (0.069) (0.092) (0.162)
Export share (t-1) 0.030 0.020 0.025 0.056** 0.037 0.056* 0.053* 0.072* 0.116*
(0.077) (0.042) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.034) (0.058)
Skill share (t-1) -0.282** -0.121* -0.044 -0.013 -0.004 0.008 0.014 0.022 0.046
(0.095) (0.051) (0.030) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.038) (0.064)
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demeaned at plant level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Quantile regressions at the nine centiles of the distribution, Q1 gives the quantile regression at the 10th percentile. To mimic
plant xed eects all variables were demeaned at plant level. Stars denote signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*) percent level
of signicance.
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9Table 7: Quantile IV regression - plant sales
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
Log Chn imports (t-1) -0.4199*** -0.2522*** -0.1959*** -0.1635*** -0.1106*** -0.0591 -0.0336 0.0246 0.1112***
(0.0423) (0.0433) (0.0461) (0.0411) (0.0339) (0.03) (0.0362) (0.032) (0.0284)
Log total imports (t-1) 0.2127*** 0.1655*** 0.1323*** 0.1164*** 0.0812*** 0.0485** 0.0371 -0.0027 -0.0508***
(0.0311) (0.0366) (0.0363) (0.0331) (0.0261) (0.0234) (0.0301) (0.0241) (0.0208)
Log nr employees (t-1) 0.03 0.0514** 0.0448*** 0.0429** 0.0372*** 0.0401*** 0.0554*** 0.0567*** 0.0757***
(0.0251) (0.0208) (0.0168) (0.0151) (0.0129) (0.011) (0.0116) (0.0135) (0.0152)
Log sales (t-1) 0.7523*** 0.7419*** 0.7517*** 0.7482*** 0.7503*** 0.7383*** 0.719*** 0.6841*** 0.6036***
(0.0165) (0.0136) (0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0095) (0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0095) (0.0105)
Herndahl (t-1) -1.5433*** -0.9707*** -0.6478*** -0.5031*** -0.3769*** -0.3545*** -0.2624*** -0.2546*** -0.4116***
(0.2107) (0.1664) (0.1353) (0.1167) (0.0871) (0.0917) (0.1028) (0.0941) (0.1352)
Export share (t-1) 0.1338* 0.0739* 0.0657 0.0613* 0.0625* 0.0688** 0.0564* 0.0477 0.0608
(0.0732) (0.0498) (0.0411) (0.0393) (0.0331) (0.0289) (0.029) (0.03) (0.0447)
Skill share (t-1) -0.3725*** -0.1942*** -0.0838* -0.0557 -0.0102 0.0076 0.0201 0.0468 0.0845*
(0.0966) (0.0589) (0.0466) (0.0431) (0.0377) (0.0335) (0.0351) (0.0416) (0.0499)
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demeaned at plant level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Quantile IV regressions at the nine centiles of the distribution, Q1 gives the quantile regression at the 10th percentile. Log Chn
imports was instrumented with Chinese exports to Europe, and Chinese exports to the world except the EU, the US and Mexico.
To mimic plant xed eects all variables were demeaned at plant level. Stars denote signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*)
percent level of signicance.
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0Table 8: Quantile - skill interaction, plant sales
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
Log Chn imports (t-1) -0.024** -0.012** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.008** -0.003 -0.002
(0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Log total imports (t-1) -0.029** -0.020** -0.012** -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.010 0.009
(0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Log nr employees (t-1) -0.040 -0.009 -0.003 0.000 0.009* 0.025*** 0.038*** 0.054*** 0.091***
(0.022) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
Log sales (t-1) 0.749*** 0.744*** 0.748*** 0.750*** 0.742*** 0.723*** 0.703*** 0.671*** 0.612***
(0.020) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.015)
Herndahl (t-1) -0.959*** -0.439*** -0.369*** -0.327*** -0.301*** -0.234*** -0.276*** -0.281** -0.611***
(0.243) (0.122) (0.074) (0.061) (0.056) (0.058) (0.068) (0.094) (0.152)
Export share (t-1) 0.031 0.024 0.029 0.053 0.046* 0.055** 0.055* 0.070* 0.117*
(0.078) (0.041) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.034) (0.056)
Skill share (t-1) -0.271* -0.162* -0.136** -0.098** -0.075* -0.068 -0.086* -0.039 -0.038
(0.127) (0.068) (0.042) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (0.041) (0.055) (0.088)
Chn x Skill (t-1) -0.004 0.010 0.017* 0.020*** 0.017* 0.019*** 0.020** 0.011 0.021
(0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demeaned at plant level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Quantile IV regressions at the nine centiles of the distribution, Q1 gives the quantile regression at the 10th percentile. To mimic
plant xed eects all variables were demeaned at plant level. Stars denote signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*) percent level
of signicance.
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1Figure 2: Marginal eect of competition
This gure shows the marginal eect of competition as estimated in table 8. The axis from left
to right displays initial size percentiles, the axis running back and forth skill share percentiles,
and the vertical axis the eect of competition on size. For example: The front corner shows a
negative marginal eect of Chinese competition on size for the rm at the 5th percentile of size
(Q5) and the 1 percent percentile of skillshare (S1).
32Table 9: Product drop overall
OLS IV First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (Fs 3) (Fs 4) (Fs 4)
Prod drop Prod drop Prod drop Prod drop Chn comp Chn comp Chn comp int
Chn comp Mex (t-1) 0.0879** 0.150** 0.327*** 0.522***
(0.0399) (0.0588) (0.124) (0.164)
Log imports (t-1) 0.404 0.406 0.348 0.355 -0.280 -0.258 -0.000702
(1.954) (1.956) (1.733) (1.739) (0.450) (0.453) (0.120)
Log tot sales (t-1) -0.554 -0.558 -0.423 -0.435 -0.324* -0.319* -0.145*
(1.692) (1.692) (1.520) (1.520) (0.189) (0.189) (0.0837)
Herf. (t-1) -0.817 -0.807 -0.589 -0.559 -0.358* -0.330* -0.0364
(0.801) (0.800) (0.716) (0.714) (0.185) (0.183) (0.0796)
Nr prod (t-1) -0.285*** -0.289*** -0.280*** -0.293*** -0.0143 -0.0116 -0.00280
(0.0613) (0.0613) (0.0549) (0.0551) (0.00873) (0.00839) (0.00399)
Exp. share (t-1) -0.102 -0.108 -0.0958 -0.112 -0.0320* -0.0293* -0.0129*
(0.133) (0.133) (0.120) (0.122) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.00667)
Skill share (t-1) 0.0795*** 0.0808*** 0.0798*** 0.0841*** -0.00227 -9.827*** -6.237**
(0.0262) (0.0247) (0.0235) (0.0194) (0.00198) (3.767) (2.603)
Chn x share (t-1) -0.249* -0.797***
(0.129) (0.268)
Chn comp -US -EU (t-1) 0.111 0.0943 0.0345
(0.0679) (0.0678) (0.0232)
Chn comp EU (t-1) 0.481*** 0.513*** -0.000958
(0.0626) (0.0667) (0.0106)
Interaction instrument 1 -1,417 4,282***
(870.3) (810.5)
Interaction instrument 2 615.4*** 390.4**
(236.0) (163.1)
Observations 85770 85770 83276 83276 83276 83276 83276
F-stat 17.01 15.26 10.75
Sargan p 0.230 0.334 0.334
Note: Robust standard errors used, stars give signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*) percent level of signicance. The last
three columns show one rst stage for the the instrumented variable in column three and two rst stages for the instrumented variables
in column four. Variables are adjusted to improve legibility: Nr prod and Exp share by a factor of 10 1, skill share by 10 2, total
imports by 10 3, product share by 10 4 and the Herndahl index by 1010. Firm-product and year controls used.
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3Table 10: Product drop from export
OLS IV First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (Fs 3) (Fs 4) (Fs 4)
Prod drop Prod drop Prod drop Prod drop Chn comp Chn comp Chn comp int
Chn comp US (t-1) -0.0542 0.0695 -0.0442 0.159
(0.0567) (0.0821) (0.0992) (0.127)
Log imports (t-1) -0.00338 -0.00342 -0.00338 -0.00344 -0.000327 -0.000319 -0.000290
(0.00464) (0.00463) (0.00405) (0.00404) (0.00235) (0.00235) (0.000955)
Log tot sales (t-1) 0.0143 0.0163 0.0146 0.0177 -0.0168** -0.0166** -0.00226
(0.0397) (0.0398) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.00711) (0.00710) (0.00295)
Herf. (t-1) 1.746 1.769 1.760 1.784 -0.544*** -0.540*** -0.161***
(1.693) (1.690) (1.487) (1.480) (0.136) (0.136) (0.0502)
Nr prod (t-1) 0.0203* 0.0201* 0.0202* 0.0200* 0.00280 0.00271 0.00104
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.00269) (0.00269) (0.00136)
Exp. share (t-1) 0.00235 0.00298 0.00230 0.00345 0.00470* 0.00489* 0.00199*
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.00276) (0.00273) (0.00115)
Skill share (t-1) -0.0582** -0.0345 -0.0582*** -0.0171 -0.00418 0.00302 0.0146***
(0.0247) (0.0260) (0.0216) (0.0239) (0.00565) (0.00624) (0.00344)
Chn x share (t-1) -0.375*** -0.652***
(0.114) (0.171)
Chn comp -US -EU (t-1) 0.266*** 0.279*** -0.0256
(0.0375) (0.0511) (0.0169)
Chn comp EU (t-1) 0.780*** 0.840*** -0.0759**
(0.0947) (0.104) (0.0308)
Interaction instrument 1 -0.158 0.878***
(0.174) (0.156)
Interaction instrument 2 -0.0385 0.297***
(0.0700) (0.0495)
Observations 16687 16687 15837 15837 15837 15837 15837
F statistic 20.18 19.87 22.12
Sargan p 0.244 0.291 0.291
Note: Robust standard errors used, stars give signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*) percent level of signicance. Additional
controls for the exit of a rm from export markets and rm exit were used. The last three columns show one rst stage for the the
instrumented variable in column three and two rst stages for the instrumented variables in column four. The Herndahl index is
adjusted by a factor of 1010 to improve legibility. Firm-product and year controls used.
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4Table 11: Product sales
OLS IV First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (Fs 3) (Fs 4) (Fs 4)
Prod sales Prod sales Prod sales Prod sales Chn comp Chn comp Chn comp int
Chn comp Mex (t-1) -0.197 -0.868*** -1.287** -3.876***
(0.185) (0.262) (0.602) (0.832)
Log imports (t-1) 0.0239** 0.0243** 0.0261** 0.0265** 0.000329 0.000313 9.86e-05
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.000527) (0.000527) (0.000143)
Log tot sales (t-1) -0.286*** -0.287*** -0.239*** -0.238*** -0.00490** -0.00482** -0.00182*
(0.0773) (0.0768) (0.0751) (0.0751) (0.00206) (0.00206) (0.000930)
Herf. (t-1) 0.155** 0.155** 0.176*** 0.172** -0.00297 -0.00295 -0.000385
(0.0631) (0.0630) (0.0678) (0.0674) (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.000838)
Nr prod (t-1) -0.0132 -0.00852 0.0106 0.0287 -0.00159* -0.00184** -0.000411
(0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0242) (0.0240) (0.000919) (0.000933) (0.000471)
Exp. share (t-1) 0.413*** 0.416*** 0.384*** 0.406*** -0.00192 -0.00212 -0.000995
(0.0550) (0.0550) (0.0545) (0.0548) (0.00187) (0.00189) (0.000722)
Skill share (t-1) 6.827 6.652 6.234 162.0 -0.0459**
(8.833) (8.663) (7.719) (171.7) (0.0215)
Chn x share (t-1) 1.894*** 10.38***
(0.425) (1.735)
Chn comp -US -EU (t-1) 0.0745*** 0.0736*** 0.0201***
(0.0190) (0.0191) (0.00614)
Chn comp EU (t-1) 0.542*** 0.566*** -0.00790
(0.0677) (0.0702) (0.00989)
Interaction instrument 1 -8,770 50,824***
(7,344) (7,638)
Interaction instrument 2 329,884 604,870
(460,420) (514,798)
Observations 107601 107601 91517 91517 91517 91517 91517
F statistic 19.21 18.92 11.83
Sargan p 0.991 0.949 0.949
Note: Robust standard errors used, stars give signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*) percent level of signicance. Additional
controls for the exit of a rm from export markets and rm exit were used. The last three columns show one rst stage for the the
instrumented variable in column three and two rst stages for the instrumented variables in column four. The Herndahl index is
adjusted by a factor of 1010 to improve legibility. Firm-product and year controls used.
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5Figure 3: Marginal eect of competition, plant level
Based on the fourth column of the IV regressions reported in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5.
36Figure 4: Marginal eect of competition, product level
Based on the fourth column of the IV regressions reported in tables 9, 10, 11 and 12.
37Table 12: Export sales product
OLS IV First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (Fs 3) (Fs 3) (Fs 4)
Prod sales Prod sales Prod sales Prod sales Comp Chn US Comp Chn US Share interaction
Chn comp US (t-1) -0.794** -1.876*** -1.079* -2.393***
(0.319) (0.368) (0.573) (0.585)
Log imports (t-1) 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.000715 -0.000380 -2.50e-05
(0.0461) (0.0461) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.00196) (0.00214) (0.000791)
Log tot sales (t-1) -0.140 -0.160 -0.148 -0.172 -0.00746 -0.0112 0.000912
(0.217) (0.217) (0.190) (0.190) (0.00718) (0.00758) (0.00379)
Herf. (t-1) 0.373 0.350 0.323 0.291 -0.0724*** -0.0936*** -0.0281***
(0.903) (0.903) (0.795) (0.797) (0.0176) (0.0216) (0.00661)
Nr prod (t-1) -0.000195 0.00264 -0.000372 0.00299 -0.000248 -0.000436 -0.000462**
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.000461) (0.000490) (0.000186)
Exp. share (t-1) 1.436*** 1.424*** 1.438*** 1.423*** 0.00303 0.00282 0.00150
(0.0913) (0.0908) (0.0800) (0.0794) (0.00254) (0.00265) (0.00110)
Skill share (t-1) 1.85e-05 1.54e-05 0.179 0.141 7.84e-05 -0.00932*** 0.000824
(1.68e-05) (1.54e-05) (0.147) (0.133) (0.00336) (0.00355) (0.00233)
Chn x share (t-1) 3.421*** 4.074***
(0.660) (0.854)
Chn comp -US -EU (t-1) 0.282*** 2.893 -3.017***
(0.0391) (2.879) (1.020)
Chn comp EU (t-1) 0.832*** 1.020*** -0.138***
(0.0902) (0.109) (0.0337)
Interaction instrument 1 -0.183 1.175***
(0.149) (0.148)
Interaction instrument 2 0.794 10.93***
(3.543) (3.505)
Observations 21049 21049 19802 19802 19802 19802 19802
F statistic 29.07 24.61 20.89
Sargan 0.469 0.444 0.444
Note: Robust standard errors used, stars give signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*) percent level of signicance. Additional
controls for the exit of a rm from export markets and rm exit were used. The last three columns show one rst stage for the the
instrumented variable in column three and two rst stages for the instrumented variables in column four. The Herndahl index is
adjusted by a factor of 1010 to improve legibility. Firm-product and year controls used.
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8Table 13: Robustness 3, Industry-year xed eects
IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exit Exit exp Sales Exp sales
Chn comp (t-1) 1.193** -6.736***
(0.516) (1.393)
Sales (t-1) -0.0549*** 0.644***
(0.00241) (0.00663)
Sales int (t-1) -0.134*** 0.623***
(0.0454) (0.130)
Chn comp US (t-1) 1.562*** -3.916***
(0.593) (0.963)
Exp sales (t-1) 0.00139 0.399***
(0.00517) (0.0132)
Exp sales int (t-1) -0.136*** 0.313***
(0.0516) (0.0808)
Herndahl (t-1) 0.0618* 0.0311 -0.524*** -0.473*
(0.0373) (0.0938) (0.0952) (0.280)
Exp share (t-1) -0.0204* 0.0240 -0.970*** 0.276***
(0.0120) (0.0277) (0.0322) (0.0889)
Skill share (t-1) -0.00367 -0.0239 -0.0300 -0.0976
(0.0148) (0.0465) (0.0391) (0.142)
Total imports (t-1) -0.00210 -0.00207
(0.00148) (0.00397)
Total imports US (t-1) -0.000313 0.0118
(0.00443) (0.0136)
Plant xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35376 12089 38774 11771
Sargan p 0.0755 0.268 0.225 0.0918
Note: Robust standard errors used, stars give signicance at one (***), ve (**) and ten (*)
percent level of signicance. These regressions are identical to the fourth column of plant OLS
regressions in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5, except for the additional inclusion of HS-2-year control
variables. An example of such a control are fertilizers in the year 2000.
.
397 Appendix 1: Bias
As is often highlighted in the econometric literature, a xed eects model with lagged dependent
variables is likely biased. While the size of that bias for a model with a lagged dependent
variable has been described (Nickell (1982)), we are not aware of a formulation of the bias of
an interacted lag dependent variable. To investigate this bias we undertake a simple simulation
exercise.
We generate a panel data of 1000 rms over a time period of 10 years. We generate a simulated
competition variable, which is distributed iid. uniformly between 0 and 1 (just as the Chinese
imports share in the previous analysis is bounded by 0 and 1). In the rst period sales are
exogenously given and distributed iid. standard normally. In each further period we generate
sales for rm i in period t as:
Salesit = Competitionit 11 + Salesit 12 + Salesit 1Competitionit 13 + it
The error terms it are iid. standard normally distributed. We assume the parameters: 1 =
 0:5, 2 = 0:5, 3 = 0:5. After computing the data we estimate above model with the inclusion
of rm xed eects. To see the direction and size of the biases of the coecients, we repeat
described data generation and estimation 1000 times. Table 14 reports how often the estimated
coecient was signicantly (at ve percent level) below or above its true value, and how often
we could not reject that it is equal to zero. This count reads as follows:
Table 14: Simulation results
Coecient Below Above Zero
Competition (1) 3 118 0
Sales(2) 1000 0 0
Interaction (3) 182 2 0
The coecient on the lagged sales is always below its true value of 0.5 (at ve percent level of
signicance), and always above zero. The coecient on lagged competition is 118 times above
its true value of -0.5, three times below it and never zero. This suggests a modest attenuation
bias. The interaction is over 180 times below its true value of 0.5, and two times above it. Hence
we nd evidence for an attenuation bias for all three coecients that is most pronounced for
lagged sales. The OLS sales regressions are thus potentially biased in a way that would lead us
to underestimate the true size of the eects, and lower the signicance of our estimates.
8 Appendix 2: Model
In great part, the competitive success of Chinese exports results from their ability to undercut
the prices charged by other suppliers (as argued by among others Broda and Romalis (2009)).
In a simple model we want to illustrate that if cost undercutting is the main characteristic of
Chinese exports, we might expect heterogeneous results for rms and products on the Mexican
40market. While this toy model is not a rich description of the economy, it is a simple guide for the
empirical investigation, and contains a general way to think about unilateral competition.
Consider a Mexican retailer i that sells a good of a certain quality. Initially the store sells only
a domestic product, that it obtains from a Mexican producer at costs cH. For our argument it is
irrelevant how the plant producing the item determines the price at which it sells the product.
We just assume that this price is increasing in marginal costs.
We further dene that if one domestic rm has lower costs than another for the same product
at the same quality, the lower cost rm has production advantages (which might consist for
example of a better management or lower production costs), as in Melitz (2003). We refer to
these dierences as higher productivity, and think of the more productive rm as one that can
deliver equal quality for a lower price. As in the literature on multi-product rms we further
assume that the costs of a product contain an element of rm productivity, such that the costs
of a product of a given rm are positively correlated, conditional on product dierences. Thus
the price at which a producer oers a good might be characterized as the product from a
random draw from a product productivity distribution and a rm productivity distribution, or
in our case we may write cH = f('F;'P), where 'F denotes a rm productivity, and 'P a
product productivity (this assumption was used for example in Bernard, Redding and Schott
(2009)).
The retailer has local monopoly power, and sells the good at price pi(cH)  cH to the local
consumers, from which it faces a downward sloping demand. We assume the price function
p(c) to be increasing in costs. The prots from selling the domestic product are in one period
equal to (pi(cH)   cH)qH
i , where qH
i is the optimal quantity of the product sold if the purchase
price to the store is cH. The store discounts future periods with the discount factor , which is
assumed to be between zero and one. Then present plus discounted future prots are equal to:
(pi(cH)   cH)qH
i =(1   ).
We consider the situation in which a foreign competitor (from China) enters the market to
compete with the domestic producer by delivering a perfect substitute for that good at cost cF.
We assume that the Chinese competitors also take their productivity from a random distribution
and after observing their productivity decide if they want to enter the Mexican market or not. If
the foreign competitor oers a lower price than the local producer (cF < cH), the retailer might
consider switching supplier. We assume that store i can undertake such a change for the xed
switching cost fi. We assume the switching costs fi to be heterogeneous across stores. A varying
cost element emerges if it is costly to exit existing contracts, and these existing contracts have
dierent expiry dates. Another reason for heterogeneity in switch costs is, that the costs for
writing dierent contracts with the new suppliers will also depend on the nature and structure
of the retailer, or variation in the diculty to overcome language barriers. Finally, dierent
levels of risk aversion or judgment of the reliability of the new producer might again lead to
dierent expectations of the switching cost. Hence if N stores sell a similar product, a situation
could emerge in which some of the stores change the suppliers while others do not.
The retailer changes supplier if [(pi(cF) cF)qF
i  (pi(cH) cH)qH
i ]=(1 ) > fi, and is indierent
between changing or not if the inequality is an equality. If cF < cH the left hand side of the
inequality must be greater than zero, since even at initial quantities this cost reduction would
result in greater prot for the store. Using a similar argument it can be shown that prots of
41store i must be decreasing in costs c.
From this simple setting, we generate several propositions:
Proposition 1: A product from a more productive rm sells at larger quantities. By denition
we characterize a more productive product as one that is passed on to the stores at lower costs
conditional on quality. Given the assumptions of a downward sloping demand and a price
function p(c) that is increasing in costs, a lower cost product will be sold at a lower price pi(cH)
conditional on the market for that product, and hence at higher quantities.
Proposition 2: A more productive rm sells larger quantities. If a high and a low productivity
rm produce the same number of products, from proposition 1 the more productive rm must
sell larger overall quantities. Given downward sloping demand in the market of each good, a
productive rm with lower expected costs is more likely to sell in addition also a higher number
of products.
Proposition 3: Entry of a competitor is more likely to cause smaller products to exit from the
market. Everything equal, the greater the cost dierence between the domestic and the foreign
producer (cF  cH) is, the more likely is a store to switch to the foreign producers. Conditional
on product, a product with higher costs is smaller (proposition 1), hence smaller products are
more likely to be dropped as a competitor enters the market.
Proposition 4: Entry of a competitor is more likely to cause smaller rms to exit the market.
A rm exits the market if all its products do. Hence from proposition 2 and 3 the statement
must hold.
Proposition 5: Conditional on survival, entry of a competitor reduces sales of a small product
more than sales of a large product. In this model we think of sales reduction as a partial
replacement of the Mexican product by some retailers, and not by others due to dierences
in the xed costs fi. Since a replacement by all stores is more likely for the small products
(proposition 3), also the replacement by some of the stores must be more likely.
Proposition 6: Conditional on survival, entry of a competitor reduces sales of a small rm more
than sales of a large rm. The same argument as in proposition 5 can be made with respect to
proposition 4.
These propositions coincide largely with predictions made by the emerging models on multi-
product rms in international trade referenced in the literature section. From this simple model
we take the motivation to focus on product and rm exit as well as sales as interesting dependent
variables, and expect a heterogeneous eect across products and rms of dierent size. The
model might also be used to predict the eects of competition on a shared third market also,
hence we do not expect the results for Mexican exporters on the export market to be very
dierent from the domestic eects.
This model also creates an incentive to upgrade productivity for the established producers when
faced with competition. Such a relationship was found by Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2008)
for European manufacturing rms. Thus our nding (see section 4) that large rms grow as a
reaction to Chinese competition is not inconsistent with the model sketched.
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